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ABSTRACT 
This thesis assesses the U.S. National Guard State Partnership Program through a review 
of three partnerships: West Virginia National Guard-Qatar, Colorado National 
Guard-Jordan, and Massachusetts National Guard-Kenya. The partnerships are first 
analyzed within a national security and military doctrinal framework for security 
cooperation in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response. Then, they are 
evaluated based on an academic framework regarding counterterrorism and military 
humanitarian assistance. The two frameworks provide a holistic picture of the program’s 
efficacy and areas of improvement. This thesis argues that the program, as conducted 
within the partnerships evaluated, provides an effective means to pursue counterterrorism 
and humanitarian crisis management security cooperation objectives. The program is 
successful overall due to the stability and longevity of relationships nurtured within the 
partnerships, but also for more nuanced reasons that account for the inherent 
contradictions between providing aid and bilateral assistance. The program can be 
improved to meet doctrine by diversifying participants in engagements and topics for 
engagement, in order to better address the complex relationship between terrorism and 
humanitarian crisis. However, care must be taken to avoid expanding the program unduly 
in order to avoid incentivizing partner-nation behavior that creates conditions that 
increase the likelihood of terrorism and humanitarian crises. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After nearly two decades of an unrelenting campaign of counterterrorism in the 
Middle East, Central and South Asia, and Africa, the United States is still fighting against 
extremist terrorists as it began in response to the attacks of 9/11. In fact, U.S. policymakers 
must wonder whether the last two decades’ efforts have produced meaningful results in 
their goals, as al-Qaeda has now been joined in the realm of transnational terrorism by the 
Islamic State. How can governments proactively and reactively craft effective 
counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis strategies that alleviate the ill-effects of both 
phenomena, which are often tied together? What is the best combination of governmental 
programs leveraging all aspects of national power to address complex national security 
questions? What is the military’s role in executing these strategies and are its operations 
value-added in these security cooperation endeavors? This thesis will provide a 
comparative analysis of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and State Partnership Program 
(SPP) in order to address these questions. The Colorado-Jordan (CONG-Jordan; est. 2004), 
West Virginia-Qatar (WVNG-Qatar; est. 2018), and Massachusetts-Kenya (MANG-
Kenya; est. 2015) partnerships are the subjects of this study. Specifically, this thesis will 
examine how each of these SPP partnerships work to address counterterrorism and 
humanitarian crisis response through military means to support U.S. national security 
cooperation strategy. 
The SPP is a Department of Defense (DOD) program that seeks to leverage “whole-
of-society relationships and capabilities to facilitate broader interagency and corollary 
engagements spanning military, government, economic and social spheres.”1 An SSP 
partnership is formed between a U.S. state’s National Guard and a foreign Partner Nation 
to create a mutually beneficial relationship to develop both parties’ military, security 
forces, and disaster response capabilities. The concept behind the SPP is to create lasting 
security cooperation programs that provide a voluntary and consistent means of 
 




engagement in a flexible, tailored approach that recognizes and incorporates the unique 
challenges and needs of the parties involved, as they change through the duration of the 
partnership. The SPP is grounded in the guidance of National Security Strategy (NSS) of 
the United States that recognizes “the invaluable advantages that our strong relationships 
with allies and partners deliver.”2 This core principle—that working with allies to achieve 
national interests has a synergistic effect—has guided the program since its beginnings 
dating back to 1994 and the years immediately following the end of the Cold War with the 
1991 collapse of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).  
A. BACKGROUND 
The SPP arose from the United States’ recognition that the failed USSR would 
create both an opportunity and a threat in the newly independent former Soviet Bloc 
countries in the Baltics. The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) more broadly, were forced to reckon with questions of whether to expand the 
alliance further eastward into the void left by the USSR or pursue some sort of other 
construct that would work to bring these newly independent states closer to the West in 
terms of governance, security and stability objectives, and outlook. The original 
partnerships under the Joint Contact Team construct were formed with the objective of 
helping former-Soviet Bloc states transition to democratic governments with civilian-led 
militaries.3 Within this post-Cold War context, the NGB recognized that it sat in a unique 
position to provide expertise regarding the creation of a national guard structure and 
function within these nations, and that this endeavor would keep the NGB itself relevant 
after the defeat of its primary enemy-the USSR.4 Throughout the program’s history, the 
emphasis has lessened on democratic institution-building, as evidenced by the 
establishment of partnerships with monarchies such as Jordan and Qatar. The evolution 
 
2 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2017), 2, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-
0905.pdf. 
3 William Boehm, The National Guard State Partnership Program: Forging and Maintaining Effective 
Security Cooperation Partnerships for the 21st Century, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: Historical Services 
Branch of The Office of Public Affairs of The National Guard Bureau, 2014), 15. 
4 Boehm, 2. 
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and refinement of the program’s strategic objectives suggests a recognition that effective 
national security strategy to address global issues may be better served by the pursuit of 
security cooperation partners that are undemocratic, when and where democratic partners 
are unavailable.  
B. THE PROBLEM 
The SPP is now nearly three decades in existence and has evolved from a Baltic-
state centric, democratic institution building military-to-military program to a globe-
spanning whole-of-government approach to a vast array of security cooperation objectives 
across 82 partnerships.5 In that time, comparatively little academic research has been 
conducted regarding the real results achieved by the SPP, especially in specific security 
cooperation objectives. Furthermore, what little research has been done has not been 
squarely focused on the contemporary academic research regarding how to conduct 
effective security cooperation programs, or the understanding of national security threats. 
Altogether, there has been precious little holistic research that identifies what is working 
and what is failing with specific partnerships, and how the partnerships’ contexts contribute 
to success and failure on the partnership-level in order to make suggestions for 
improvements across the SPP as a whole.  
C. MAJOR QUESTION AND ARGUMENT 
The central question of this thesis is whether the SPP partnerships between CONG-
Jordan, WVNG-Qatar, and MANG-Kenya provide an effective means to increase national 
security through the counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis security cooperation 
objectives. This thesis utilizes a comparative analysis of three partnerships, limited in scope 
to counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis security cooperation objectives, to address 
whether the SPP is effective in delivering positive results in these areas, both 
geographically and functionally. Whether the SPP should exist and whether the function 
of the SPP should reside with the NGB or elsewhere is outside the scope of this analysis. 
 




Instead, given the proliferation of partnerships and the objectives they seek to address, this 
analysis assumes that the SPP under the NGB is appropriate, and has the potential to be 
successful in being a tool for whole-of-government security cooperation endeavors broadly 
as the bridge between civilian and military capabilities. Ultimately, this thesis argues that 
the SPP, as conducted within the partnerships evaluated, provides an effective program to 
pursue security cooperation objectives in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis 
management.  
The program is successful overall due to the stability and longevity of relationships 
that form through the partnership, but also for more nuanced reasons that account for the 
inherent contradictions between providing aid and bilateral assistance. These contradictory 
impulses and the unintended side effects that manifest in governance and societal 
considerations must continually be assessed and addressed in order to improve the 
shortfalls identified in this analysis. Programs can realize their greatest potential in 
combatting terrorism through a holistic approach: they must address or acknowledge 
through careful coordination with the wider security cooperation institution, the social, 
economic, and governmental realities that combine to incentivize the use of terrorism. 
Additionally, governments have a duty to form policies that react to terrorist events in a 
manner that does not exacerbate the problem. This interplay between assistance and the 
unintended consequences will be discussed at length in Chapter V.  
D. SIGNIFICANCE  
The security cooperation objectives of counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis 
response are of special concern due to their inextricable nature. One need not look any 
further than the cycle of terrorism provoked-humanitarian crisis created by the 
establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Caliphate (ISIL, which is now 
known only as the Islamic State (IS) as their territorial integrity has collapsed, and their 
members widely dispersed) and the subsequent shocks this sent throughout the region. 
With the United States’ continued attempts to draw down its footprint in the region, it is 
prudent to identify programs that have successful security cooperation histories and 
identify what is working, what has been tried and failed, and what may be applicable to use 
5 
in the place of active duty forces going forward. It is essential to constantly be reassess 
what is the best combination of governmental programs leveraging all aspects of national 
power to address complex national security challenges. 
Counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management are security cooperation 
objectives that are designed, per U.S. doctrine, to be whole of government efforts working 
in coordination with foreign partners. Thus, research answering which programs under 
military’s purview are most successful at security cooperation execution in 
counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management is essential to answering the broader 
question: what is the best combination of governmental programs leveraging all aspects of 
national power to address complex national security questions? This thesis is designed to 
address part of that gap in understanding just how effective the SPP is regarding 
counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODS 
The scope of this thesis is limited to the analysis of the three aforementioned 
partnerships’ operations regarding counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management 
security cooperation objectives. Each partnership undertakes engagements for other 
security cooperation objectives, which are outside the purview of this analysis. 
Additionally, this thesis will not analyze or make suggestions regarding other entities, 
besides the NGB, that may be more effective or appropriate in performing these functions, 
other than where research suggests a fundamental mismatch between the nature of the 
security cooperation objective and the NGB that degrades the efficacy of the program.  
Within this limited scope, this thesis first explores the strategic guidance of Joint 
Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation, JP 3-26 Counterterrorism, and JP 3-29 
Humanitarian Assistance, found in Section B of Chapter II. This analysis will be grounded 
within the discussion and direction of the current NSS (2017). The guiding question will 
be: what are the most effective practices for humanitarian crisis management and 
counterterrorism SC, according to U.S. doctrine? This question will help to establish the 
doctrinal framework that will be used to analyze each partnerships’ effectiveness from a 
doctrinal perspective. Section C of Chapter II will outline the major academic arguments 
6 
with regard to terrorism and counterterrorism policy, and humanitarian crisis response, in 
order to establish an academic framework of analysis.  
Chapter III provides an overview of the SPP as a whole program. It will provide a 
historical origins, objectives, and development. Additionally, this chapter will explore what 
guiding documents exist to manage operations of the program at the NGB-level. It will also 
detail the creation and maintenance of partnerships, and the generic process for executing 
partnership engagements. Critically important to this chapter are the details regarding 
funding and authorities, which have significant impact on the program’s execution and 
associated limitations that will become apparent in the discussion of the actual case studies. 
Chapter IV will document each of the individual SPP partnership case studies, and 
then details each of the case studies’ particular contexts and characteristics pertinent to the 
two security cooperation objectives under study in this thesis. The CONG-Jordan program 
provides the baseline of analysis as it is much longer-lived than the other two programs of 
study. Additionally, the three partnerships are in two different are in different geographic 
Combatant Commands (CCMD), which allows for comparison across two different chains 
of command, vastly different cultural contexts, and different specific problem sets that 
nonetheless share many characteristics (Islamic extremist terrorist threats occur in all three 
countries, for example). The WVNG-Qatar program allows for closer comparisons to be 
made about conclusions drawn along regional and cultural lines from the more robust 
CONG-Jordan case study. The MANG-Kenya program allows these conclusions to be 
tested in a different cultural and CCMD context.  
Collectively, sources for Chapter IV include public affairs releases, after action 
reports, annual fiscal reports, congressionally mandated annual reports, internal and third-
party assessments of the program (like those produced by the Government Accountability 
Office, or academic works), and partnership- and program-level policy and guidance 
documentation. Interviews were conducted with individuals having first-person 
experiences at the program or partnership level of the SPP regarding their experiences, 
expert assessments, and understanding of the SPP’s value insecurity cooperation strategy. 
The interview sources provide nuanced, qualitative analysis regarding stakeholders’ 
evaluations and experiences of the program to flesh out the quantitative analysis approach. 
7 
Chapter V addresses whether the structure, objectives, and execution of the SPP as 
detailed in Chapter IV could be considered effective regarding counterterrorism and 
humanitarian assistance using the two frameworks established. In Chapter V, focus will be 
on the ways that each partnership has operationalized the strategic guidance found in 
doctrine in order to progress towards each case study program’s objectives. Policy 
documents, after action reports, and interviews with program experts regarding their 
experiences and assessments are used to evaluate how well strategy has been converted 
into executable tasks.  
Additionally, evaluations regarding the quantitative nature of the program were 
conducted: how many engagements, and what type of engagements, were conducted year 
over year, where available? By the conclusion of Chapter V, the thesis will demonstrate 
strengths and weaknesses of the three SPP case study partnerships in two functional 
objectives, within two different analytical frameworks. Chapter VI is limited to a summary 
of findings and suggestions regarding future research in this field.  
8 
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II. INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY COOPERATION WITHIN 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY CONTEXT 
This chapter reviews the broad basis of knowledge regarding security cooperation 
in humanitarian assistance and counterterrorism objectives. The first portion will explore 
security cooperation as envisaged by the U.S. government through the NSS. The second 
part will provide a deeper look by examining security cooperation as codified in military 
strategic doctrine from whole-of-government to SPP-level. Then, the analysis will canvass 
the influential academic arguments regarding how the U.S.’ national security is bolstered 
and best pursued through security cooperation in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis 
management. This will provide a comparative framework to understand the SPP’s security 
cooperation efforts from both a U.S. doctrinal and research approach. These two 
frameworks will then be utilized in Chapter IV to assess the three case study programs in 
the two functional security cooperation objectives, and thus provide suggestions for areas 
of improvement, or highlight successes, in both objectives.  
A. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
This thesis will focus on the 2017 NSS policy guidance pertaining to the 
counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response, though the 2015 NSS produced under 
President Obama contained similar verbiage regarding the topic.6 The 2017 NSS refers to 
the priority actions of “Defeat Transnational Terrorist Organizations” and “Reduce Human 
Suffering” as a function of championing American values abroad.7 Additionally, guidance 
pertaining to the engagement with Partner Nations has bearing on this thesis. The 2017 
NSS says of the Middle East region that the United States “will strengthen partnerships, 
and form new ones, to help advance security through stability,”8 which provides broad 
 
6 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf,  9–10. 
7 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC:White House, 
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, 41. 
8 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 49. 
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latitude for security cooperation engagements for both counterterrorism and humanitarian 
crisis response initiatives. The 2017 NSS guidance pertaining to Africa is similarly broad: 
the United States “will continue to respond to humanitarian needs while also working with 
committed governments and regional organizations to address the root causes of human 
suffering.” These statements are necessarily broad to provide strategic guidance to the 
entire diplomatic and military institutions of government. Therefore, drilling down further 
into the military guidance that dictates how the NGB translates this national strategy into 
operational programs is critical for identifying whether the program is effective at meeting 
strategic objectives.  
B. UNITED STATES JOINT DOCTRINE 
1. JP 3-20 Security Cooperation 
The U.S. government established what it considers to be the best information, ways, 
and means regarding DOD security assistance, which when administered by the DOD is 
termed “security cooperation,”9 in Joint Publication 3-20 Security Cooperation. Security 
cooperation is “all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions, programs, and activities 
with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help 
promote U.S. interests”10 as defined in the NSS. This doctrine provides strategic guidance 
regarding the boundaries, principles, and intent of security cooperation in enhancing the 
U.S.’ national security. Security cooperation can be understood to strengthen and expand 
“the existing network of U.S. allies and partners, which improves the overall warfighting 
effectiveness of the joint force and enables more effective multinational operations.”11 As 
the SPP is a security cooperation program administered by the NGB, it must adhere to JP 
3-20, which is aligned with and informed by the priorities established in the NSS.  
 
9 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation. JP 3-20 (Washington, DC, 2017), https://www.jcs.mil/
Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf. 
10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation, v. 
11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Security Cooperation, I-1. 
11 
2. JP 3-26 Counterterrorism 
The relevant portion for this thesis of JP 3-26 Counterterrorism is Chapter 3: 
Organizing for Counterterrorism. The section regarding Partner Nations details “U.S. 
strategy against terrorist organizations and individuals associated with terrorist 
organizations are a mixture of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic options” 
to form “an enduring counterterrorism partner in the region and often elsewhere.”12 Thus, 
there is doctrinally enshrined belief that Partner Nation engagement through whole-of-
government instruments of national power can provide lasting results in counterterrorism 
efforts. Figure 1. Partner Nations Contributions provides a visual depiction of the 
interconnected nature of humanitarian assistance with creating conditions adverse to 
fostering terrorism.13 Of significant note for this analysis are the first four layers of the 
graphic. These areas are the primary wheelhouse addressed in the operations of the SPP 
examined in this thesis. Further, Combat Forces make up only a small portion of the 
counterterrorism effort through security cooperation operations. Instead, the strong 
foundation supporting counterterrorism efforts by direct military means relies on 
preemptive strengthening of other aspects of governance and state capacity. 
 
Figure 1. Partner Nation Contributions 14 
 
12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterterrorism, JP 3-26 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_26.pdf, III-5 and III-6. 
13 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterterrorism,, III-6. 
14 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, III-6. 
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3. JP 3-29 Humanitarian Assistance   
The SPP’s humanitarian assistance efforts are directed by JP 3-29. The pertinent 
sections for this thesis examine the intersectional nature of humanitarian assistance and 
counterterrorism. Specifically, U.S. joint doctrine identifies humanitarian crisis events as 
providing an opportunity wherein “terrorists may exploit organizations working in 
emergencies and areas of conflict to raise and move funds, provide logistics support, 
encourage terrorist recruitment, or otherwise support terrorist organizations.”15 This 
literature review will examine the relationship between humanitarian conditions and 
terrorism in further detail under the section that deals with the research arguments 
pertaining to counterterrorism and humanitarian assistance. For this section, is sufficient to 
note that the DOD believes that humanitarian assistance is an integral part of the 
counterterrorism effort, and military participation or leadership of activities in and with 
Partner Nations to address human suffering aids security cooperation efforts in the 
counterterrorism realm.  
C. ACADEMIC RESEARCH ON SECURITY COOPERATION 
One question this thesis seeks to address is whether the U.S. government’s 
understanding of security cooperation in counterterrorism and humanitarian assistance 
captures academia’s understanding of these objectives and how best to achieve national 
security in these realms. The following section will address the current trends of thought 
regarding the management of terrorism and humanitarian crises. It will then explore the 
intersection between terrorism and humanitarian crisis to illuminate ways in which policies 
to address one security cooperation objective may undermine or complement efforts in the 
other objective. 
1. Crafting Effective Counterterrorism Strategies 
The academic conversation regarding the origins of terrorism ballooned in the 
United States after the attacks of 9/11. Significantly, the arguments that once 
 
15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Humanitarian Assistance. JP 3-29 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019). 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_29.pdf, A-8. 
13 
predominated—that terrorists are crazed madmen, or severely impoverished individuals 
with nothing to lose—have been stripped of their simplistic appeal as the data failed to 
provide support for these conclusions.16 Instead, the data point toward the fact that 
terrorists, far from originating “from the poorer segments, terrorist operatives are more 
likely to come from the mid-income and highly educated strata of society.”17 Savun and 
Tirone’s collective analysis of economic deprivation leads to terrorism hypothesis shows 
only “mixed results.”18 The data further show that terrorists often have what they and their 
supporters consider to be rational motives and decision-making processes when choosing 
the path of terrorism, even in the case of suicidal terrorist acts.19 It is therefore imperative 
that counterterrorism strategies do not fall into the trap of targeting just economic 
deprivation, or writing off terrorists as unpredictable, incurable madmen where the only 
solution is to eliminate them. Such folly will yield no significant results in rooting out 
terrorism long term.  
There is increasing data on both the micro- and macro-level of assessment that 
supports one argument amongst the many for the origins of terrorism: “low levels of civil 
liberties and political participation, state repression, abuse of physical integrity rights, and 
weak rule of law are shown to be associated with greater participation in terrorism”20 or 
support for terrorist organizations. The research regarding the causal relationship between 
aid designed to bolster democratization and civil society has also supported the link 
between foreign aid designed to support democratization and the reduction in transnational 
terrorism.21 However, as there is a contrary body of research that is testing this linkage and 
 
16 Burcu Savun and Daniel Tirone, “Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool: More Liberty, Less Terror?” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 62, no. 8 (September 2018): 1607–35, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0022002717704952, 3. 
17 Savun and Tirone, “Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool,” 3. 
18 Savun and Tirone, “Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool,” 3. 
19 Amien Kacou, “Five Arguments on the Rationality of Suicide Terrorists,” Aggression and Violent 
Behavior 18, no. 5 (September 2013): 539–47, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2013.07.010, 546. 
20 Savun and Tirone, “Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool,” 4. 
21 Savun and Tirone, “Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool,” 6.  
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finding that there is insufficient support for a research framework regarding the effect of 
political participation on moderating terrorist groups.  
Dalacoura’s analysis of Middle Eastern Islamist terrorist groups assessed the 
political participation and its effect on terrorism hypothesis and found it incapable of 
providing a consistent causal relationship with terrorism. Rather, there is greater support 
from the wide survey of cases for political actors conducting a strategic analysis of their 
objectives and asking whether terrorism is (un)likely to be the best way to meet these 
objectives.22 Her analysis of terrorism in the Middle East found that terrorism is likely to 
be used if it is deemed to be effective to achieve political objectives. She found that when 
terrorism is assessed by actors to have ineffective or adverse effect on the likelihood of the 
group achieving political success, the group moderates. Therefore, counterterrorism 
strategies would do well to address democratization and civil society building initiatives 
within the larger context of foreign assistance for security cooperation objectives, but this 
must not be the sole focus.  
Recent research regarding the relationship between military aid and the incidence 
of terrorism suggests that too much military aid can contribute to the issue of terrorism in 
the receiving country. Dimant, Krieger, and Meierrieks found that increasing amounts of 
military aid to foreign nations is associated with an increase in anti-American terrorists.23  
Their data suggest the causal mechanism to be that recipient governments become less 
responsive to aggrieved populations and more unwilling to undertake rent-seeking policies 
when their funding is supplemented by military aid. This insight provides another dynamic 
regarding effective counterterrorism policy and state capacity to monitor and address 
terrorist threats through military means, and highlights the interconnected nature between 
effective governance, economic opportunity, military policy and practice and the incidence 
of terrorism abroad. 
 
22 Katerina Dalacoura, Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511977367. 
23 Eugen Dimant, Tim Krieger, and Daniel Meierrieks, “Paying Them to Hate US: The Effect of U.S. 
Military Aid on Anti-American Terrorism, 1968–2014.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2020. https://doi.org/
10.2139/ssrn.3639277, 29. 
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Further recent research into the matter of state capacity from Larue and Danzell 
provides an even more detailed examination of state capacity. Their analysis defines state 
capacity as a measure of state fragmentation or cohesion regarding the state’s ability to 
deliver consistent governance under the rule of law and respond to popular grievances. 
Their results show correlation between less fragmentation and a reduction in terrorist 
events, with more fragmentation being associated with a greater incidence of terrorism, of 
both transnational and domestic varieties.24 This bolsters the arguments of Dimant et al. 
regarding the need for states to maintain responsiveness to the population’s grievances. 
Together, the research suggests that effective security cooperation policy to address 
terrorism through capacity building needs to be carefully weighed against encouraging 
corruption or disincentivizing rent-seeking behaviors in the Partner Nation governments. 
Further, military aid and engagement should undergo additional scrutiny to ensure that 
increased state capacity in the form of greater state resources and activity in the security 
sector does not grant undue influence to the military or security establishments at the 
expense of the rule of law. 
With the origins of terrorism far from definitely diagnosed, national security 
strategists may do well to craft counterterrorism strategies that ameliorate the effects of 
terrorism and work with foreign partners to reduce reactionary policies that inadvertently 
encourage terrorism as a method to affect political change, despite not having a clearly 
defined causal mechanism founded in rigorous research findings. A balanced approach that 
addresses the complex interplay between state responsiveness through effective 
governance, the importance of the rule of law, and that above all recognizes that broadly 
terrorists choose terrorism because they deem it to have the greatest likelihood of eliciting 
the desired response from the state should guide policymaking decisions.  
 
24 Patrick Larue and Orlandrew Danzell, “Rethinking State Capacity: Conceptual Effects on the Incidence 
of Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, July 13, 2020, 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/
09546553.2020.1776702, 13. 
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2. Humanitarian Assistance and Crisis Management 
The academic debate regarding humanitarian crisis management will be limited in 
this analysis to those activities conducted by military forces, and the wisdom and efficacy 
of using such forces for crisis management. Much debate has centered around using the 
military, whose primary mission is warfighting through identifying the threat and 
neutralizing it, in a situation where a country’s own citizens may be deemed threatening. 
Critiques of using the military in humanitarian crisis response, especially in states with 
weak democratic institutions or highly divided societies, point to issues regarding the 
military forces may abuse their power under the martial law, authoritarian rule that may 
not end once the crisis is under control, politicization of aid through association with the 
military.25  
The counterargument is that the military “is uniquely postured to provide this 
assistance because of assets such as transport ships and aircraft, medical personnel, 
engineering equipment and search and rescue expertise.”26 Additionally, U.S. supporters 
of these operations during humanitarian crises argue that military forces operated under the 
guidance and control of civilian leadership and at the direction of federal crisis 
management organizations as augmented resources, not the lead agency.27 Indeed, 
critiques of employing military forces during humanitarian crises point out in certain 
limited circumstances, there are benefits to the involvement of military forces that 
strengthen response efforts and reduce human suffering. However, the counter arguments 
 
25  Daniel Byman, “Uncertain Partners: NGOs and the Military,” Survival 43, no. 2 (June 1, 2001): 97–
114. https://doi.org/10.1080/713660351; Graham Heaslip and Elizabeth Barber, “Using the Military in 
Disaster Relief: Systemising Challenges and Opportunities,” Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply 
Chain Management 4, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 60–81. https://doi.org/10.1108/JHLSCM-03-2013-0013; S. 
J. Pettit and A. K. C. Beresford, “Emergency Relief Logistics: An Evaluation of Military, Non-Military and 
Composite Response Models,” International Journal of Logistics Research and Applications 8, no. 4 
(December 1, 2005): 313–31 (continued on next page) https://doi.org/10.1080/13675560500407325;  
Thomas Weiss and Kurt Campbell. “Military Humanitarianism.” Survival 33, no. 5 (September 1, 1991): 
451–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339108442612. 
26 David Vergun, “Humanitarian Operations Save Lives, Build Goodwill,” U.S. Department of Defense, 
April 15, 2019. https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Features/Story/Article/1814289/humanitarian-operations-
save-lives-build-goodwill/.  
27 Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies. “Chapter 1: Introduction to Security Cooperation.” In 
The Management of Security Cooperation, 39th ed. Accessed August 1, 2020. https://www.dscu.mil/
documents/publications/greenbook/01_Chapter.pdf?id=1, 10. 
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regarding the use of military forces to secure the neutral space in humanitarian crises point 
out that humanitarian aid groups are increasingly identified as supporting or complicit with 
the military forces that facilitate their operations.28 Thus, when the military is used in 
support of civilian humanitarian crisis operations, the humanitarian principle of neutrality 
is compromised and the operation’s success jeopardize.29 When military forces and their 
associated governments control access to the neutral space, it could incentivize those 
governments to manipulate this access and the suffering of the populations for national 
self-interest at the expense of humanitarian operations.30 
There is a grey middle ground between practicality of resource utilization, and 
ideology of the ethics regarding the military’s nature and proper role debated in the absence 
of crisis. This dichotomy is quite artificial, and crumbles under the requirements of action 
that humanitarian crises create, with no easy answer as to how best avoid the pitfalls. 
Additionally, considerations in weak states may be significantly different due to the nature 
of military power upon governance and thus the analysis in this thesis will evaluate each 
case study Partner Nation upon the framework of state capacity to maintain effective 
political control to limit military influence over the political environment during a 
humanitarian crisis.  
3. The Intersection between Terrorism and Human Suffering 
This section will further explore the potential link between human suffering during 
periods of crisis and how it affects the incidence of terrorism. How can (in)effective 
humanitarian crisis management affect the incidence of terrorism? How can 
counterterrorism policy reduce the likelihood of terrorism-related humanitarian crises?  
What role can effective bilateral military cooperation play in mitigating the threats to 
national security of both terrorism and mass human suffering events? The following 
paragraphs will explore the academic research regarding the ability of states to build 
 
28 Richard Barrett, “Contesting the Neutral Space—a Thematic Analysis of Military Humanitarianism,” 
Accessed August 27, 2020,  https://www.academia.edu/34432435/
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29 Barrett, “ Contesting the Neutral Space ,” 20. 
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capacity in their law enforcement, homeland security, and military forces to create 
protective measures to disincentivize terrorism and build resilience to terrorism acts that 
do occur to mitigate human suffering.  
The last two decades have provided a growing body of research into the links 
between human suffering and the incidence of political violence. Studies in this field have 
shown that increasing numbers of refugees in a host nation contribute to greater civil unrest 
and conflict in that state,31 but the increased challenges of hosting refugees does not result 
in an increase in terrorism across all instances.32 Additionally, states fearing unrest and 
destabilization often seek to curtail rights and repress populations in a preemptive attempt 
to control the situation.33 Thus, states in the midst of a humanitarian crisis may encounter 
a flood of humanitarian aid that increases the likelihood of corruption, use of terror tactics 
to control this resource, and further state repression which could drive radicalization.34  
When states are faced with decisions on how to respond in the wake of a terrorism 
incident, it is important to remember the feedback loop between human suffering, 
radicalization, and the incentivization of terrorism as a tool for political action. Research 
shows that states are able to play an important role in the trajectory of the crisis in the way 
that policymakers respond to the crisis, and communicate their counterterrorism efforts in 
response to, or the face of, ongoing threats.35 De Graaf concludes that “government 
statements and memoranda [communicating counterterrorism policy] are not mere texts: 
 
31 Seung-Whan Choi and Idean Salehyan, “No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Refugees, Humanitarian 
Aid, and Terrorism,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 30, no. 1 (February 2013): 53–75, 
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Refugees Rebel: Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Refugee Militarization.” International Migration 51, 
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they create reality”36 regarding the nature and scope of the threat and who should feel 
threatened.  
This process of defining the threat in order to justify policy has important 
implications for counterterrorism policy as it relates to humanitarian crises. If displaced, 
minority, or foreign populations are defined as synonymous with, or sympathetic to the 
terrorist actors as defined by state policy, social conflict can be elevated domestically 
between “threatened” populations, and “threatening” populations.37 Thus, governments 
must not only create humanitarian policies that address the social, political, and economic 
needs of displaced populations during crises, they must also communicate any policy 
responses in a way that does not exacerbate the problems associated in a way that makes 
terrorism a more attractive political action. 
Not only does the policy definition of the terrorism threat matter, and the careful 
consideration of the nuances of at-risk populations in a humanitarian crisis related to 
terrorism is paramount. For example, traditional views of humanitarian crises stemming 
from terrorism have often considered youth and women to be victims of these violent acts, 
and therefore are treated in policy as recipients of aid and protection.38 Research and data 
over the last nearly two decades of counterterrorism efforts has shown that this assumption 
and treatment of a vast swath of vulnerable populations has been detrimental to the 
effectiveness of counterterrorism operations. For example, a full 20% of terrorism plots 
and suspect arrests involved women, and the voluntary population of women immigrants 
to the Islamic State caliphate demonstrates that certain terrorist groups have molded 
effective messaging policies that attract significant numbers of women.39 In the growing 
awareness of this reality, U.S. Central Command has formulated a priority specifically to 
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address the risks associated with improperly managing the care and support for violently 
displaced persons during counterterrorism operations, or as different actors in the area 
conduct military operations to reestablish control.40  
Taken together, this body of research suggests that effective humanitarian crisis 
management must address the pitfalls of the possibility of aid encouraging corruption, 
decreasing state responsiveness to popular grievances to address social conflict, and 
encouraging state repression and abrogation of the rule of law. Additionally, 
counterterrorism policy needs to address the nuances in at-risk populations, like 
specifically accounting for women’s concerns, in order to mitigate radicalizing messages 
from terrorist organizations that fill the historic void of governments’ policies in this 
dimension. These capacity building efforts to aid Partner Nations in building their 
institutions to manage human suffering must recognize the delicate balancing act of 
ameliorating the effects of crises, but not encouraging negative state actions that at the 
same time incentivize the use of terrorism to effect political change. 
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III. INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU’S 
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM 
A. PROGRAM ORIGINS 
The roots of the SPP emerged at the end of the Cold War with what were known 
Military Liaison Teams (MLT) under the U.S. Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) as a 
“method to establish direct contact with defense ministries and armed forces structures”41 
in Central and Eastern European nations newly independent of the USSR. The MLTs 
worked in small groups to travel to these former Soviet states under familiarization visits 
(FAM), designed to exchange information about each military’s practices. These FAMs 
are a crucial and enduring aspect of the SPP that continue throughout all partnerships 
through today, despite the change in focus from democratic institution building through 
military-to-military engagement to whole-of-government security cooperation through 
shared objectives.  
B. GUIDING DOCUMENTS 
The SPP authorized in U.S. Code per Title 10, Section 341 and gives the Secretary 
of Defense the authority, with concurrence of the Secretary of State, to establish a program 
between state NGs and Partner Nations’ military, security forces, or other governmental 
organizations whose primary functions include disaster response or emergency response, 
in order to support U.S. security cooperation objectives.42 Importantly, per the above, all 
engagements in foreign countries require that “the member is on active duty in the Armed 
Forces at the time of such participation,”43 and thus they are acting in a federal, not state, 
capacity. The SPP is governed by DOD Instruction 5111.20 State Partnership Program, 
which delineates the responsible parties and their authorities, and provides an overview of 
the program management and requirements. The SPP’s central management guide is 
pending approval, but a draft of the document provides important insight as to the current 
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22 
state of management, processes, and authorities. The entirety of the program’s effort falls 
under the strategic guidance of the NSS, and the military’s execution falls under the 
direction of the doctrine in JP 3-20 Security Cooperation, details of which were discussed 
in the previous chapter. The current Mission Statement of the SPP is:  
The State Partnership Program supports the security cooperation objectives 
of the United States and the geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) by 
developing enduring relationships with partner countries and carrying out 
activities to build partner capacity, improve interoperability, and enhance 
U.S. access and influence while increasing the readiness of U.S. and partner 
forces to meet emerging challenges.44 
C. PROGRAM OBJECTIVES 
This section discusses the SPP-level objectives for SC, not specific objectives at 
the partnership level, which will be addressed in the following chapter. The SPP is designed 
to partner a state’s NG with a “friendly or allied nation…to share responsibilities for 
promoting peace and security.”45 The partnerships and annual engagements “promote 
national objectives, stability, partner capacity, and better understanding and trust between 
the United States and foreign countries.”46 The SPP is designed to utilize some of the 
greatest strengths of the NG over active-duty (AD) military units to achieve security 
cooperation objectives. Primarily, the NG is less expensive to maintain personnel, 
capabilities, and functions than AD,47 the personnel are more stable in their positions and 
thus more apt to build lasting relationships,48 and the NG has more linkages and access to 
resources in the civilian sector through the citizen-soldier model.49 These aspects are 
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brought to bear on the whole-of-society strategic efforts spearheaded through the 
Department of State and reliant on the NSS guidance.  
D. PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS  
The SPP is managed by the NGB and executed by the CCMD within which the 
Partner Nation falls. The NG forces of each state within an SPP relationship provide the 
personnel required to support annual engagements, augmented as needed by the civilian 
sector or other government agencies in both countries to achieve the specific objectives of 
engagements. The following paragraphs will discuss how a partnership is established and 
executed on a standard basis, and Chapter IV will elaborate on the nuances of each 
partnership under study.  
1. Establishing a Partnership 
Foreign countries that wish to partner with the U.S. for particular security 
cooperation concerns will submit a formal request to the U.S. Ambassador, who must 
concur that the partnership and the objectives suggested by the requesting nation are in the 
best interest of the U.S.’ national security. Then, the request is sent to the CCDR, who 
reviews the request from the perspective of defense capabilities, and if they concur, the 
request is sent to the Chief of the NGB for review and concurrence.  
At the NGB level, a review and solicitation for volunteers from the state NGs is 
distributed. This solicitation details which security cooperation objectives the requesting 
nation is interested in pursuing. Thus, each state is able to partner with nations that share 
similar interests and challenges. Finally, after a state is recommended for partnership, the 
entire process is reversed with every previous party reviewing the final details of the 
partnership. Upon approval by the requesting Partner Nation, the engagements in support 
of the defined objectives are able to take place. Figure 2 provides a visual depiction of the 
partnership establishment process.50  
 
50 Boehm, The National Guard State Partnership Program, 25. 
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Figure 2. Establishing a SPP Partnership 51 
2. Maintaining Partnerships   
Each SPP is planned on an annual basis through bilateral engagements. The 
engagements are designed to “build partner capacity, improve interoperability, and 
enhance U.S. access and influence while increasing the readiness of U.S. and partner forces 
to meet emerging challenges.”52 The activities occur across a range of security cooperation 
objectives and align with: 
-The Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) encompassing the Partner Nation’s 
geographic area  
-The U.S. Chief of Mission’s (COM) objectives 
-The Military Departments’ interoperability and training missions and 
objectives 
-The Partner Nation’s national security objectives53 
Frequency of engagements varies annually based on the wider national security 
objectives for the CCMD, the priorities of the leadership of state’s NG, the Partner Nation’s 
leadership and commitment, and contemporary demands on the program. This flexibility 
in the number and type of engagements to fit the current context’s demands and emerging 
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priorities is touted as one of the greatest strengths of the program.54 However, the SPP as 
a strategic security cooperation program of record is taking steps to move away from the 
year-to-year planning model in some important ways as problems the SPP has encountered 
throughout the decades are being resolved. Further details regarding the case studies’ 
annual engagement frequency and type will be discussed in Chapter IV. In the event that 
one partner no longer wishes to maintain the partnership, the bilateral program goes 
dormant and the funding is allocated elsewhere. 
3. Funding the SPP 
Historically, the SPP has faced issues stemming from the way in which the program 
is funded and how funding interacts with program management and manning. This section 
will detail the intricacies of SPP funding and how it creates challenges in meeting national 
security cooperation objectives. The SPP is managed by the NGB, and the stable-state 
program management personnel are sourced from the NG. However, engagements with 
Partner Nations are funded through COCOM Operations and Maintenance (OM) funds. 
Significantly, the NG personnel must be on active duty (Title 10) orders when they 
participate in engagements overseas. Thus, a problem in funding is created when moving 
personnel from Title 32 to Title 10 status, as the care and feeding of these personnel is not 
captured within OM funds, nor is it accounted for in authorizations under traditional NGB 
funding streams. Furthermore, engagements are designed to meet specific objectives, 
which are associated with different authorities. Therefore, any “activity that relies on 
multiple security cooperation authorities must comply with all legal and policy 
requirements for each authority relied on, and use the appropriate funding for each 
authority.”55 The intricacies of complex engagements spanning multiple objectives 
complicate planning and manning the activities appropriately in order to utilize the best 
personnel available to optimize each engagement.  
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IV. THE SPP PARTNERSHIP CASE STUDIES 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter provides a brief Partner Nation and regional-specific overview of the 
major security cooperation challenges faced by the Partner Nations. It will also provide a 
detailed historical analysis of the origins, objectives, and annual execution of each case 
study partnership within the context of domestic and regional security cooperation trends. 
This context seeks to illuminate the circumstances influencing the trajectory of the 
partnership and identify the extent to which each partnership is able to tailor its execution 
in response to regional and domestic events affecting Partner Nation-domestic, regional, 
and U.S. national security priorities. Documentation regarding the specific partnership 
objectives and program establishment and evaluation criteria is not available at the 
unclassified, unrestricted level. However, it is worth emphasizing that all partnerships’ 
objectives must be aligned with the TCPs, as well as DOD, COM, and Partner Nation 
security cooperation objectives. Therefore, this chapter will rely on press releases covering 
partnership engagements, published program data, and documents published by the DOD, 
COM, Partner Nation, and CCMDs to construct a reasonable picture regarding program 
objectives.  
B. THE COLORADO NATIONAL GUARD-JORDAN SPP 
1. Jordan and the Middle East Context 
Jordan sits in a strategically important position, both geographically and politically, 
for U.S. interests in the region. Though many crises have beset the Kingdom since its 
creation in 1921, it has navigated a delicate course that balances the competing pressures 
of Arab and Western interests in the region. Throughout the decades, Jordan has maintained 
communication with the United States, and in the last two decades the relationship has 
strengthened and grown notably. Jordan’s primary security concerns relate to regional 
destabilization from the ongoing Palestinian crisis, upheaval in Syria, and regional power 
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struggles in the form of Iran and Yemen especially.56 However, the way in which Jordan 
conceives of its national security over the decades has evolved. Historically, it prioritized 
traditional security threats like armed conflict, but now focuses on an approach 
emphasizing the belief that “stability and prosperity in the political, economic, social, 
technical, media and environmental fields are considered the true pillars of national 
security.”57 The pivot from overt armed threats in the form of war and violence to 
addressing societal weaknesses in many realms as preconditions to stability and security is 
of critical importance to this work’s analysis regarding U.S.-Jordan cooperation under the 
SPP. Therefore, a more detailed analysis of those societal weaknesses and challenges is 
necessary to place the efforts of the SPP into its proper context. 
Jordan must deal with a significant refugee population— nearly 3 million formally 
registered with the UN Refugee Agency and the UN Relief and Works Agency58—
displaced mostly from Israel-occupied Palestine, Syria, and Iraq from numerous crises 
since the country’s creation. The social, economic, and political ramifications of such a 
large refugee population demand careful national security planning and practice to ensure 
that the humanitarian situation is effectively managed. As the previous chapters suggest, 
the intersection of humanitarian crises and terrorism dictate that Jordan must effectively 
balance the grievances of Jordanians and refugees, with limited resources and a challenging 
regional context already beset by extremist terrorist movements. However, Jordan perhaps 
has a relative advantage over its neighboring states with regard to responsiveness to the 
populations’ demands, as it has never been lulled into the security of a resource-rich rentier 
state, and already has some representative elections. In reality, though, democratic 
institutions are effectively very limited in terms of opposition party participation and the 
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real power wielded by the elected House of Representatives.59 This limited groundwork 
of democratic institutions and the potential for representation in government could provide 
a meaningful option to populations with grievances that might otherwise turn to violence, 
if they perceived that the path would be more effective.  
Jordan is challenged not only by the demands of an enormous displaced population, 
but by the constraints imposed by the nation’s geographic location. Jordan is resource-poor 
in comparison to other regional actors, and faces shortages of arable land, water, and 
traditional energy resources to support its growing population.60 The U.S. Government has 
shown consistent interest in encouraging public-private bilateral partnerships with 
Jordanian firms to address these challenges in a mutually beneficial way, specifically 
through Memorandums of Understanding that provide assistance funds for this purpose.61 
Overall, the United States has provided over approximately $24 billion in bilateral 
assistance to Jordan since beginning economic and military assistance in 1951 and 1957, 
respectively.62 Additionally, decades of crisis and questionable economic policies have 
created a growing threat of fiscal crisis due to national debt and balance of payments 
resulting from limited economic options.63  
Jordan’s attempts to address the brewing debt crisis resulted in a program of neo-
liberalist economic reform at the end of the 20th century, which is ongoing and has had 
consequences on both the Jordanian military and the populace. The government sought to 
impose economic austerity measures, which had the unintended side effect of contributing 
to social unrest due to the abrogation of the existing social contract between Jordan’s 
citizens and the monarchy: economic welfare support in return for authoritarian 
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governance.64 As Baylouny notes, this popular disquiet of previous regime-backers that 
came from breaking the contract was met not with greater democratization as a method of 
containing the movement, but rather an increase in reliance upon and strengthening of the 
military and security institutions.65 Thus, the military and the regime are even more tightly 
intertwined. All of these factors pose significant challenges to the monarchy under King 
Abdullah II in creating a political system that is capable of addressing myriad grievances, 
a contentious social dynamic, and real threats to national security in the form of regional 
instability and domestic terrorism. 
It is important to note that the United States itself sits in a precarious position at the 
time of this writing with regard to its influence on Jordanian and regional affairs, and how 
they impact the domestic and regional security context. A changing relationship between 
the United States and Israel under President Trump exacerbated old points of conflict in 
the Arab world regarding Israel-occupied Palestinian territory, and stressed the limits of 
the Kingdom’s willingness to maintain the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty.66 In 2017, the 
Trump Administration declared recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, 
overturning nearly three decades of established policy, and throwing the international 
community into disarray.67  
This development, in combination with decision in November 2019 to rescind a 
1978 State Department legal opinion that stated Israeli settlements in the occupied West 
Bank were inconsistent with international law, has caused great anger in Palestinian and 
Arab populations towards the United States as apparent Middle East peace-broker.68 This 
reaction amongst Palestinian supporters was further solidified upon the unveiling of the 
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January 2020 “Peace to Prosperity” plan forwarded by the Trump Administration. Though 
the plan had no realistic chance of being adopted, it solidified the perception of favoritism 
by the United States towards Israel’s political and security goals at the expense of 
Palestinians and the surrounding Arab nations, especially those hosting large populations 
of displaced Palestinians.69  
Jordan has so far limited overt criticism of the Trump Administration’s Israel policy 
as it relates to Palestinian territories. However, the United States’ current stance supporting 
or tacitly condoning Israel’s efforts to exert greater control over occupied territories could 
have dire implications for the U.S.-Jordan relationship. The perception that the United 
States is not an honest broker in the Arab-Israeli peace process may jeopardize the 
acceptance and support of U.S. security cooperation activities in the region. The public 
relations backlash from the Peace to Prosperity 2020 plan have the potential to undermine 
counterterrorism goals by providing a rallying cry for extremist organizations that target 
both the U.S. and U.S.-friendly governments. It may also impair the joint Jordan-U.S. effort 
to mitigate the humanitarian crises besetting Jordan and region more broadly, as the 
displaced Palestinian populations grow increasingly aggrieved with the Jordanian 
government as they sense the likelihood of repatriation or a Palestinian state slipping 
further from the realm of possible. Thus Jordan, as host to millions of Palestinian refugees, 
faces a growing challenge of effective governance and state capacity to support that 
population long term, while simultaneously meeting the challenges of supporting the 
Jordanian population in a resource scare and instable region. 
2. Colorado National Guard—Jordan Partnership  
a. Origins. The CONG-Jordan Partnership was established in 2004 and grew out of 
the working relationship solidified in response to 9/11 attacks and a shared interest around 
aviation.70 Today, the relationship spans from military and civilian expert exchanges, to 
aviation, to leadership and women in the military. 
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b. Objectives. This section will explore the strategic objectives established by the 
U.S. COM in Jordan, the TCP, and the DOD regarding security cooperation between 
Jordan and the United States. For CENTCOM, the TCP strategy is found in the Posture 
Statement of the CENTCOM Commander. For the purposes of this analysis, only the 
pertinent sections will be discussed as they intersect with humanitarian crisis management 
and counterterrorism efforts in Jordan. CENTCOM is postured to “mitigate the risks 
associated with these [IDP, refugee, and Syrian Democratic Forces] populations by 
facilitating repatriations, training and equipping guard forces, and providing the funding 
required to improve prison infrastructure,” but it recognizes that “military solutions do not 
exist” once radicalization takes hold of large populations,71 and thus there is a heavy 
emphasis on cooperative preemptive policy. Therefore, it is essential to note how the 
Posture Statement fits in with the COM priorities for Jordan, and Jordan’s own national 
security interests, as discussed in the first part of this chapter.  
The U.S. Embassy in Jordan provides the focal point of bilateral relations and 
efforts to further U.S. national security interests in Jordan. Per the Embassy, the U.S. 
recognizes the special role that Jordan plays as a moderating and stabilizing force in the 
region against extremism and human suffering.72 As such, the United States is “Jordan’s 
single largest provider of bilateral assistance”73 and within this expansive web of 
assistance, engagement, and capacity building sits the long-standing SPP partnership.  
c. Execution. The CONG-Jordan partnership is the region’s longest running 
partnership, but is also one of the entire program’s most successful and fruitful partnerships 
in terms of consistent engagement and reciprocity. This section will detail the types of 
engagements, and focus on how they have evolved with regards to changing regional and 
domestic challenges. It is, however, important to note that public records regarding the first 
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several years of the program’s engagements- from 2004 until 2012 -are unavailable. This 
record keeping deficiency was a central component of the Government Accountability 
Office’s review of the program in 2012, which concluded that the ability to assess the 
program’s effectiveness was severely undercut by this dearth of data.74  
However, there are mentions of early endeavors and the partnership’s influence on 
bilateral security cooperation more broadly. The SPP used the established partnership 
channels to more effectively tailor Jordanian support to coalition operations in Afghanistan 
through the mid-2000s and later. After identifying shortfalls in cross-cultural competency 
of U.S. personnel, the coalition leveraged Jordanian capabilities to establish Female 
Engagement Teams, which were able to access a part of society off-limits to the male-
dominated deployment teams.75 These teams also worked as outreach and education teams 
regarding messages of moderate Islam in order to counter radical violent Islamist teachings 
forwarded by the Taliban and al-Qaeda.76 Additionally, in 2012, an engagement of Public 
Affairs personnel worked to create a program of social media that sought to create social 
media content for regional use to engage with civilian populations. The objective was to 
build mutual understanding through culturally sensitive press materials that reduce the 
potential of tension between military operations and the civilian populations that result in 
human suffering and opportunities for radicalizing propaganda.77 
The focus on women’s issues in society and the military featured heavily in 
engagements, with eight iterations of engagements of women leaders occurring between 
2009–2012.78 The series seeks to broaden the discussion on women’s issues throughout 
society and has “included female congressional and business leaders from the Colorado 
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state legislature as well as female leadership of the Colorado Guard”79 and the Jordanian 
military. The focus on women’s issues is particularly important regarding the intersection 
between military and civilian spheres for dealing with humanitarian crises and 
counterterrorism in Jordan. The professionalization of the military forces, with the 
traditional female gender roles of caring for the family and providing important aspects of 
childhood education regarding cultural norms, is an important asset. The relationship 
elevates women’s issues during the refugee crisis in Jordan, as the majority of refugees in 
Jordan are woman and children.80 The line of communication, understanding, and empathy 
that the focus on these issues provides is among the many soft skills and benefits that the 
partnership provides in order to build trust between the partners and the communities they 
serve.81 Evidence of the ongoing effort can be found in annual reports and public affairs 
releases through 2019.82 In addition to more nuance capacity building of this nature, the 
partnership serves to build capacity in more tangible, measurable skills in the effort to 
mitigate the humanitarian refugee crises in Jordan, and aid in regional counterterrorism 
efforts.  
The records for SPP engagements between CONG-Jordan become much more 
robust in 2015, after the institution of the annual report to Congress, as mandated by the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2014. The FY 2015 Annual Report to 
Congress highlights the 18 engagements conducted over the FY, and 33% of the 
engagements were focused on aviation competencies.83 The focus on aviation is significant 
because Jordan seeks to utilize its aircraft in both regional counterterrorism activities and 
providing airlift support to regional humanitarian crises. The FY 206 Annual Report to 
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Congress demonstrates that Jordan and the CONG maintained a similar level of program 
activity—with 17 engagements.84 The number of engagements focusing on aviation also 
remained at approximately one-third, with an emphasis on sharing information on best 
practices and interoperability. The following FYs’ reports are unavailable to the public; but 
Public Affairs releases show the continued interest and emphasis on aviation engagements 
within the partnership to improve counterterrorism efforts domestically and regionally.85 
The FY15 and FY16 annual reports also demonstrate an enduring commitment to the 
women’s leadership and social media programming efforts.86  
C. THE WEST VIRGINIA NATIONAL GUARD-QATAR SPP 
1. Qatar and the Middle East Security Context 
Qatar has long played a more limited role in regional security issues, given the 
country’s population and resource constraints. However, it is an important player in 
counterterrorism efforts regionally. Qatar’s domestic security context is very stable 
compared to many of its neighbors. It has successfully prevented terrorist attacks on its  
soil from Islamist extremist organizations that are more common in the region.87 
Additionally, it adheres to a counterterrorism strategy that balances military and internal 
security with “intensive investment in education and increasing economic opportunities” 
for populations, both domestically and internationally, who are more at-risk for 
radicalization.88 However, these regional power struggles have resulted in Qatar pursuing 
policies that support radicalization and violent extremism in the region-such as close ties 
with Iran, Yemeni Houthi rebels, and Palestinian groups, which further exacerbates the 
intrastate competition and tensions.  
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Qatar’s contemporary experience within the region is fraught with contention in 
large part due to these ties. From mid-2017 until early 2021, the country was blockaded by 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Jordan, and Egypt for traffic by land, sea, and air. The 
crisis resulted from ongoing tensions stemming from allegations that Qatar foments unrest 
in the region through support of Islamist groups-especially the Muslim Brotherhood- and 
its relationship with Iran.89 Throughout the crisis, the United States maintained the 
established ties with Qatar, and worked towards resolution of the crisis to balance its 
competing national security interests and ties to governments on both sides of the crisis. 
Though the blockade was recently lifted, there has not been significant progress made 
towards resolving the underlying conditions that led to its imposition in the first place, and 
thus the strategic dynamics remain tenuous. This demands that the United States weave a 
delicate path through its many relationships in the region in order to continue to forward 
its regional agenda. 
The United States finds Qatar to be an important partner is countering Iran 
strategically.90 Additionally, the United States uses al-Udeid Air Base as headquarters for 
U.S. Central Command, and the airbase provides extensive staging capabilities for ongoing 
U.S. military operations throughout the greater Middle East and CENTCOM region. The 
United States leveraged the strategic opening that the schism between Qatar and its Gulf 
neighbors has created. Where once Qatar was much more economically dependent on 
regional imports, the United States now constitutes the largest supplier of imports to 
Qatar.91 Thus, the United States receives significant economic and military support from 
the bilateral ties maintained with Qatar. This relationship with the United States is also 
critical to Qatar for a number of reasons. 
Qatar has limited ability to provide for its own security and defend its sovereignty 
without powerful allies. According to the CIA World Factbook, the country is 
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comparatively tiny both geographically, at nearly the size of the U.S. state of Connecticut, 
and in population.92 There are roughly 2.5 million people living in Qatar, but only between 
11–12% of that population are citizens as of a 2015 census, with the remainder consisting 
largely of migrant workers. Qatar is able to support its citizens with extensive services and 
benefits through a robust patronage network funded by oil and gas reserves. The monarchy 
has deftly exploited these resources to raise the national profile and influence abroad, as 
well as to keep peace and stability at home, despite general and acute instability in the 
region throughout the decades since Qatar’s independence from Britain’s protectorate 
status. Qatar has rejected hosting large numbers of refugees from the various crises in 
Palestinian territories, Syria, and Iraq.93 Thus, Qatar faces fewer challenges regarding 
direct management of refugee population and their associated grievances, or the popular 
grievances that refugees could trigger from the host population. However, Qatar is involved 
in regional humanitarian crisis management and alleviating human suffering through aid 
distributions. These activities fall outside the scope of the SPP relationship, but it is worth 
noting that Qatar plays an influential role through participation in regional affairs.  
2. The WVNG—Qatar Partnership 
a. Partnership Origins. The diplomatic relationship between the United States and 
Qatar was established through cooperation in support of Iraq against Iran during the 1980–
1988 Iran-Iraq War.94 Bilateral affairs are managed by the U.S. Embassy in Doha. Qatar 
and the United States have a long history of military cooperation, especially with providing 
access for permanent staging and operations in the Middle East through al-Udeid Air Base, 
the largest American military base in the region, established in 1996.95  This military 
cooperation facilitated the expansion of relations to creation of a SPP partnership in 2018. 
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b. Partnership Objectives. The partnership is grounded in the same regional and 
national strategic guidance as that discussed in the section examining the CONG-Jordan 
SPP, since they fall within the same CCMD. Therefore, this section will only detail where 
the partnerships diverge at the nation-level as they pertain the COM and Qatari national 
security context specifically. Qatar’s national security context domestically and within the 
region is focused on regional balancing of powers, and resolving the humanitarian crises 
of the region, as discussed at the outset of this section. Further strategic objectives specific 
to Qatar governing the SPP objectives are directed by the State Department mission. The 
U.S. Embassy in Doha works to coordinate bilateral cooperation “on a wide range of 
regional and global issues. Qatar has played a constructive financial, political, and military 
role in addressing regional turmoil, and in partnership with the United States, has 
contributed to progress, stability, and prosperity in the region.”96 The SPP partnership 
objectives are:  
to increase military and diplomatic cooperation, develop and expand 
defense capabilities and mutually beneficial training interactions. In 
addition, the two entities [Qatar and WVNG] will work to increase 
interoperability of forces and deter and disrupt criminal and terrorist 
activities in the region.97  
c. Partnership Execution. Given that the partnership is still nascent, it is difficult to 
ascertain the trajectory of the program at this time. The partnership was formally 
announced in May of 2018, so the budget allocations for annual engagement planning had 
already been doled out. Therefore, the initial engagements occurred in FY19. Additionally, 
little engagement has been able to take place during CY2020, due to the ongoing SARS-
CoV-2 global pandemic. This means that the program had about 15 months in which to 
plan and execute engagements since its foundation. However, even given these time 
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constraints, the participants have engaged in a small number of familiarization exchanges 
and subject-matter expert engagements.98  
The first official engagement occurred in February 2019 and focused on aviation. 
Qatar and the WVANG shared information regarding capabilities, experiences, and 
training with the Qatari C-17A and C-130J transport aircraft.99 Qatar focuses its transport 
capabilities on aiding in airlift operations during humanitarian crises and operations in 
support of their national security objectives, like counterterrorism or regional 
stabilization.100 The participation of the WVANG aviators alongside their Qatari 
counterparts ensured that there is a broader basis of familiarity and understanding between 
the partners should coalition operations be required in the future that demand a high level 
of interoperability.  
The SPP also works within larger, ongoing partnership efforts between the two 
countries under established security cooperation lines of effort. At the end of 2020, the 
WVNG SPP participated in the annual exercise Operation SPARTAN SHIELD, which 
seeks “to promote regional stability, increase joint capability among our friends and allies 
in the region, and to continue a long-standing partnership between the United States and 
Qatar.”101 The personnel from the SPP brought expertise regarding military engineering 
and decision making processes in support of regional stability operations.102 This type of 
engagement demonstrates the program’s construct to augment and complement existing 
security cooperation efforts, while bringing capabilities from the NG to active duty 
commands (CENTCOM, in this instance). 
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D. THE MASSACHUSETTS NATIONAL GUARD-KENYA SPP 
1. Kenya and the West Africa Security Context   
Kenya, in comparison to the other two case study Partner Nations, arguably faces 
more daunting security challenges stemming from myriad issues domestically and 
regionally. The Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index ranks Kenya as the 29th most fragile 
country out of 178 globally ranked.103 However, much of Kenya’s security threat 
environment and the accompanying instability originates from the proximity to failed 
states, like Somalia (ranked 2nd globally for state fragility), and South Sudan (3rd), and 
Ethiopia (21st), and Uganda (24th).104 The surrounding instability, as well as formidable 
domestic challenges that contribute to domestic instability will be covered as they impact 
the security environment and the SPP partnership in the humanitarian crisis and 
counterterrorism realms.  
Kenya is sub-Saharan Africa’s third largest economy, bolstered by regional finance 
and transportation sectors, and a top tourism destination for the region.105 However, 
though Kenya has a relatively larger economy in the region, it also suffers significantly 
from economic inequality. The World Bank estimates Kenya’s GINI Coefficient—the 
measure of income inequality in a country—is in the top 15–20% of all nations every 
year.106 This extreme level of inequality demands effective governance to address 
economic grievances of a large, and growing, population where wealth, opportunity, and 
resources are not distributed equitably. However, this demand for effective governance and 
institutional capability has not been consistently met by the real capabilities of the 
government.  
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Kenya’s history as a British colony imparts significant challenges to institution 
building. First, the modern day nation state of Kenya did not exist in its territorial form 
prior to its creation as a British colony, and thus the people and government had no 
historical memory of nationhood to refer to after independence from Britain in 1968.107 
This is significant because an established sense of nationhood has been demonstrated to 
have a stabilizing effect on post-colonial governments by providing a historical reference 
point for normalcy and institutional expertise on how to govern once colonial direction 
departs.108 Kenya is attempting to meet the challenges through democratic governance, 
but the record has been spotty with its implementation, and minority ethnic groups are often 
suspicious of the central government’s commitment to representative governance.109 
President Kenyatta’s ruling party has been frequently accused of oppressing opposition 
movements, perpetuating human rights abuses, and failing to address significant levels of 
government corruption, which has impeded some efforts at security cooperation between 
the United States and Kenya.110 However, Kenya does play an important role regarding 
regional security cooperation to counter Islamist extremist terrorism in the region, from 
both al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda affiliates.  
Kenya faces significant threats from Islamist extremist organizations operating in 
the region, which have frequently attacked military, government, and civilian targets. The 
groups undertake these attacks in an effort to destabilize the country and deter 
counterterrorism efforts, which Kenya does with a number of organizations, such as the 
African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) against al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab grew out of a 
militant Salafi group named al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) whose “core was a band of Middle 
East–educated Somali extremists that was partly funded and armed by al-Qaeda’s chief, 
Osama bin Laden.”111 Additionally, the failure of Somalia’s central government to control 
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affairs within its borders provides the potential for “collaboration among militant Islamist 
organizations in the region, including al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, al-Qaeda”112 in the 
permissive operating environment. This reality of the potential for terrorist networks to 
move from one permissive operating environment to another should they face effective 
counterterrorism policies demonstrates the need for policies that are sustainable and 
effective across many countries. The fall of ISIL’s caliphate in Iraq and Syria could push 
militants to seeks refuge in places like Somalia, directly threatening the stability of Kenya.  
However, al-Shabaab is not the only group operating in the permissive region 
around Kenya, as the civil war and violence in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo have contributed significant numbers of refugees to Kenya’s population. 
Additionally, the destabilizing effects of COVID have provided an additional hurdle to the 
government to maintain security in the nation while managing the crippling effects of 
economic lockdowns on the tourism industry and agricultural outputs, upon which a large 
portion of the economy depends. The World Bank estimates that the COVID-19 pandemic 
has increased poverty rates by 4%, or created an additional 2 million poor people, in 
Kenya.113  
2. MANG—Kenya Partnership  
Origins. The conjoined effects of political and social instability, along with the 
threat of terrorism, provided ample fodder for security cooperation initiatives under the 
SPP, and it is out of these drivers that the partnership arose. Specifically, for the purposes 
of this analysis, the focus is that MANG and Kenya partner to address capacity building in 
counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response security cooperation efforts regionally 
and domestically. 
Objectives. The AFRICOM Theater Strategy, produced in 2018 and providing 
strategic guidance through 2027, contains heavy emphasis on security through partnership. 
 
112 Council on Foreign Relations, “Al-Shabab Backgrounder.” 
. 
113  World Bank Group, Navigating the Pandemic, Kenya Economic Update (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 2020). https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail, ii. 
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Additionally, the biggest challenges identified in the strategy guidance are state fragility, 
violent extremist organizations, and U.S. access and basing options.114 The MANG-Kenya 
SPP is specifically designed to meet the National Strategy for Counterterrorism guidance 
to “emphasize the use of all instruments of American power, with a focus on non-military 
capabilities” and “encourage working with a wide-range of partners in both the public and 
private sectors.”115 Additionally, the first three of six TCP key approaches are directly 
supported by the partnership: 1) Strengthen Partner Networks; 2) Enhance Partner 
Capability; 3) Develop Security in Somalia.116 These objectives set by the CCMD, and 
within the larger security and defense strategies, also dovetail with the U.S. Embassy 
mission in Kenya to “strengthen economic stability, security, health, education, 
environment, rule of law, and democratic governance in Kenya, as well as by countering 
violent extremism.”117  
Significantly, there is a difference in emphasis between AFRICOM and 
CENTCOM regarding the extent to which large numbers of forces and materiel are 
dedicated in a permanent fashion to achieving security cooperation objectives in theater. 
The emphasis arises from the statement “AFRICOM works by, through, and with” U.S. 
partners in the CCMD Theater Strategy, which places particular emphasis on the partner 
nations being responsible for the vast majority of security cooperation operations.118 The 
central driver with regard to AFRICOM is less willingness to place the burden of 
operations on the U.S. military, either in active duty or NGB roles and resources, to achieve 
the desired effects. 
 
114  AFRICOM, United States Africa Command: Theater Strategy 2018–2027 (Stuttgart, Germany: 2008),  
https://www.africom.mil/document/33088/us-africa-command-theater-strategy-2018-2027p, 3–4. 
115 Statement of General Thomas D. Waldhauser, United States Marine Corps Commander United States 
Africa Command: Hearing before the Armed Services Committee, Senate, 116th Congress, 1st sess., 
February 7, 2019. https://www.africom.mil/document/31480/u-s-africa-command-2019-posture-statement, 
12. 
116 S.,  Statement of General Thomas D. Waldhauser, 13.  
117 Department of State, U.S. Relations With Kenya (Washington, DC: Bureau of African Affairs, 2020), 
https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-kenya/. 
118 AFRICOM, Theater Strategy 2018–2027, 4. 
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Execution. The partnership focuses primarily on capacity building and 
professionalization of the Kenyan military force. The first full year the program conducted 
engagements (FY16), there were nine activities that supported the CCMD Lines of Effort. 
Press releases regarding partnership engagements were not available on the National Guard 
Bureau news site, unlike information regarding the partnerships between CONG-Jordan 
and WVNG-Qatar. However, the MANG does utilize Facebook and other social media 
platforms to occasionally communicate information to the public regarding engagements. 
Features of the page include engagements designed to provide information sharing on 
“base defense, tactical convoys/internal convoy protection, and a collective CBRN 
training.”119 These efforts demonstrate support of the strategic objective to create a more 
resilient Kenya with greater internal capacity to mitigate and respond to the regional 
terrorist threats, as well as prepare for any associated humanitarian disaster of a CBRN 
nature. However, the engagements were limited to military participants, as far as could be 
determined.  
 
119 “Massachusetts National Guard State Partnership Program,” Facebook, Accessed December 3, 2020, 
https://www.facebook.com/Massachusetts-National-Guard-State-Partnership-Program-1751209748285864. 
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V. ASSESSING THE CASE STUDIES WITHIN THE DOCTRINAL 
AND RESEARCH SECURITY COOPERATION FRAMEWORKS 
A. THE DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK 
This section assesses the case studies within the doctrinal framework provided by 
the discussion in Chapter II, Section 1. The objective of using the doctrinal framework of 
analysis is to identify where the SPP may deviate from doctrinal guidance, and therefore 
fail to align with stated national objectives and strategic guidance regarding how to 
leverage national resources to achieve those objectives. Importantly, national security 
strategy provides broad, ambitious vision regarding a nation’s strategic priorities, and one 
must keep in mind that strategy reflects the perspective and values of the nation’s 
leadership that is created it. For the U.S., the White House produces the NSS that is 
informed by and creates a narrative regarding the historical and ideological context that 
contributes to the contemporary state of affairs, as well as how the executive branch 
believes the desired end state can be achieved.  
Effective security cooperation necessitates that two nations share at least some 
common perspective about the historical context that created joint national security 
priorities, and what means can be reasonably expected to effectively realize a positive 
outcome to achieve the shared vision. The job of the SPP is to translate this narrative 
understanding of complex security cooperation contexts, challenges, and objectives into 
actions to work towards a desired end state that meets both nations’ vision through program 
construct and execution. A brief review of the key takeaways from Chapter II, Section I 
will help to maintain the focus of analysis in this section. Analyzing the programs through 
this framework will identify where programs have room for improvement, or are achieving 
national security strategy guidance. 
Doctrinal Framework Takeaways 
Security cooperation is a whole-of-government effort to expand the network of U.S. 
allies and partners in order to create more effective and efficient defense capabilities and 
improve security and stability globally. Within security cooperation, counterterrorism 
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policy focuses heavily on preemptive state capacity building in sectors outside of direct 
combat operations against threats. Terrorism and human suffering are inextricably linked, 
and neither security cooperation objective can be addressed without consideration to the 
unintended consequences that can manifest in the other.  
1. CONG—Jordan SPP 
This partnership, perhaps unsurprisingly given its longevity and consistency of 
engagement, is the most developed and nuanced partnership, spanning extensive efforts in 
counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response. The array of exercises regarding 
aviation, crisis response, and professionalization of forces demonstrate that this particular 
partnership is working to fulfill the doctrinal guidance to coordinate whole-of-government 
efforts in security cooperation. Of specific note, the participation of female leaders outside 
of the military in the women’s issues engagements highlights the careful consideration of 
other sources of expertise and experience that can provide a more holistic understanding 
of societal and military issues more broadly. Another example of effective whole-of-
government efforts are evidenced in the social media messaging campaign that included 
not just Public Affairs personnel, but members of other governmental institutions as well 
that crafts coherent and consistent messaging across the governments.  
The partnership also actualizes the doctrinal belief that military forces can have a 
value-added effect with regard to providing resources and expertise during humanitarian 
crisis response operations. The airlift aviation exchanges are of particular note in this 
regard because the coordinated assets of military airlift provide a capability largely 
unavailable to the private or non-governmental actors during ongoing crisis operations. 
Therefore, using the doctrinal framework of analysis, it is possible to conclude that the 
variety of participants across the spectrum of government and private sector and the 
diversity of engagements contained within this SPP partnership does embody the doctrinal 
guidance for effective security cooperation in the counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis 
response objectives. Thus, the doctrinal framework suggests that the SPP in Jordan is well 
established within the national-level strategic guidance which is formulated to achieve 
objectives of countering terrorism and managing humanitarian crises through whole of 
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government efforts. The CONG-Jordan SPP embodies this framework and direction 
through consistent, robust participation of military, other governmental, and non-
governmental personnel in engagements.  
2. WVNG—Qatar SPP 
There is very little data available regarding the partnership with which to evaluate 
its performance within the doctrinal framework due to the relatively recent founding of the 
partnership. However, it is possible to see evidence that the partnership is firmly planted 
in the strategic guidance in that it is squarely focused on addressing the NSS objectives 
affecting the region in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management. The 
significant consideration regarding how the WVNG-Qatar partnership deviates from the 
CONG-Jordan partnership is in the limited participation of non-military and non-
governmental actors. This is perhaps because the program is nascent; but given that 
engagements have thus far been limited to military-to-military exchanges and military 
capabilities in pursuit of counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management objectives, 
there is room for improvement and growth to meet the doctrinal guidance to leverage 
whole-of-government capabilities.  
The WVNG-Qatar SPP, because Qatar supports humanitarian crisis operations in 
the region largely through monetary donations and outreach programs to the tune of billions 
of dollars,120 should work to expand engagement participation more widely to include non-
governmental personnel who are experts in effective crisis management operations and 
refugee support. This would ensure that resources across the spectrum of national power 
were more effectively synced and aware of military efforts and capabilities, and thus if a 
crisis were to occur, there would be fewer familiarization challenges that could seriously 
degrade crisis response. Furthermore, Qatar should look to programs like Jordan, which 
has branched outside of governmental sources regarding tackling difficult and changing 
societal issues, such as gender discrimination. Not only would diversifying SPP 
engagements benefit Qatar to better understand these challenges, but the U.S. personnel 
 
120 Government Communications Office, “Qatar Foreign Policy.” 
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involved in the exchanges would be exposed to the nuances of Qatar’s specific societal 
challenges and how they are managing them, which has the potential to improve U.S. 
policies and practices with regard to similar issues. 
3. MANG—Kenya SPP 
This partnership differs slightly from the previous two analyzed because the CCMD 
guidance, nestled within the larger national security strategy, demonstrates that there is 
reluctance to dedicate the number of forces and resources to AFRICOM security 
cooperation operations that are provided to operations in CENTCOM. This is potentially a 
significant aspect of the SPP in AFRICOM and Kenya specifically. Because there are  
fewer security cooperation operations being conducted through other programs, the  
focus and emphasis of efforts is necessarily placed more on the SPP. However, the data  
regarding program execution, where available, demonstrates the lack of broad and creative 
utilization of the partnership framework to expand operations outside of engagements. The 
military engagements conducted thus far encompass military familiarization and 
professionalization which help the Kenyan security and defense forces to operate more 
effectively both domestically and abroad, especially the Horn of Africa.  
Kenya’s participation in AMISOM directly highlights their shared interest in the 
United States’ national security priority of countering violent extremism in Somalia. The 
skills and capabilities that the SPP has helped to bolster are being immediately utilized 
against the regional threats of al-Shabaab, violent extremists fleeing from failed states like 
South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and threatening Kenya’s stability, 
as well as providing more robust domestic security capabilities. However, the engagements 
continue to focus heavily on military capability and response options, rather than creating 
a holistic approach to humanitarian crisis management and counterterrorism. Significantly, 
the MANG-Kenya program could be expanded to deal especially with Kenya’s weak 
democratic institutions in a manner that discusses civilian control of the military, rule of 
law in the use of military force, and appropriate utilization of military forces during 
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Therefore, this analysis concludes that the 
MANG-Kenya program has great potential to be the focal point of efforts in security 
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cooperation between the two countries, but this opportunity has thus far not been seized 
fully.  
4. Conclusion 
Overall, this analysis finds that the SPP partnerships examined do reflect the values 
and strategic guidance of U.S. doctrine, which is the expression of the U.S. government’s 
beliefs regarding how to effectively pursue security cooperation objectives. Specifically, 
the three programs examined were particularly noteworthy in their ability to bring together 
participants from each country’s military entities. However, only the CONG-Jordan 
program demonstrated in the available data to regularly use the SPP’s authorities to bring 
in a diverse array of participants both within and outside the government as appropriate to 
a single focal point with consistent engagement to meet established objectives in 
counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response.  
B. THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
Security cooperation doctrine states emphasizes the belief that military-to-military 
engagements can “help democracies consolidate, fragile states avoid failure, and 
authoritarian states liberalize.”121 However, as discussed in Chapter II, there are aspects 
of bilateral aid and engagement that can have adverse consequences in terms of state 
capacity and stability with regard to managing human suffering and counterterrorism 
efforts. This section will explore the SPP within the academic framework provided in 
Chapter II, Section II regarding the pitfalls of counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis 
management strategy, as well as assess how well the program navigates the complex 
interplay between these two phenomena across the three case studies. It bears repeating the 
highlights of the framework established in Chapter II, Section II regarding the key 
takeaways on terrorism/counterterrorism, humanitarian crisis management, and the 
intersection between the two security cooperation functions. 
 
 
121 Derek Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security cooperation, and The 
Changing Face of the U.S. Military, Second (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), 10. 
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Terrorism Takeaways 
Terrorism does not originate solely from economic deprivation or the actions 
clinically insane, or irrational, actors. In many instances, but not all, is the incidence of 
terrorism and support for terrorist groups associated with lower levels of democratic 
governance, rule of law, and state repression. States that are responsive to the grievances 
of their populations have lower incidence of terrorism, and foreign aid to support states 
that reduces state responsiveness and/or increases repressiveness, and undermines 
democratic norms has the potential to be counterproductive. Finally, terrorism is a political 
tactic of choice when conditions suggest that it will be the most effective means for the 
actors to achieve their goals. 
The Military in Humanitarian Crisis Management Takeaways 
The military can provide effective and exclusive resources and expertise to 
managing a large-scale humanitarian crisis, but ill-conceived use of the military in 
humanitarian crises can exacerbate trends towards undemocratic norms in countries with 
weak democratic institutions. Further, use of the military can politicize aid and threaten aid 
operations through eliciting violent targeting of aid personnel and resources by armed 
opponents. 
The Intersection of Humanitarian Crisis and Terrorism Takeaways 
 Unresolved large-scale humanitarian crises increase domestic and regional 
instability, and increase the likelihood of state repression and undemocratic policies in 
response. During humanitarian crises, states can stoke or allay the tensions between host 
and hosted populations through the messaging of their policy decisions and practices. 
Effective humanitarian crisis management policy is holistic and tailored to nuance in the 
needs of the displaced populations—men, women, children for example—which addresses 
grievances that incentivize the use of terrorism to force political change.  
1. CONG-Jordan SPP 
The partnership between CONG-Jordan serves as a model that other partnerships 
should strive to emulate. The partnership as it is executed receives high marks for a number 
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of reasons when analyzed within the research framework. First, the partnership has 
branched out to including non-military participants on a consistent basis to augment 
engagements and contribute to a better understanding of the bilateral efforts to achieve 
counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis objectives. Second, the partnership has 
recognized the importance of creating a narrative regarding their efforts in these objectives 
that resonates across different sectors of society. Third, the military capacity building of 
Jordan’s air forces through the SPP has realized greater capability for Jordan to conduct 
counterterrorism operations and humanitarian airlift in support of bilateral security 
objectives in the region. However, though the program has had significant and lasting 
progress in shaping and responding to issues in these areas, there are notes of caution 
regarding potential pitfalls.  
Jordan is a monarchy and thus the capacity building and aid provided to it through 
the SPP, though very small, needs to be carefully monitored to assess whether it is creating 
incentives towards undemocratic governance. Additionally, the joint efforts of CONG-
Jordanian SPP forces needs to continually be regarded within the larger context of the 
politicization of aid and whether the security cooperation operations are inducing terrorism 
by feeding counterproductive propaganda and narratives of terrorist threats. Overall, this 
SPP partnership would benefit from more analyses of annual engagements and feedback 
regarding the unintended consequences of security cooperation operations from academia 
and government sources alike.  
2. WVNG-Qatar SPP 
The WVNG-Qatar partnership is quite new, and thus the analysis provides an 
important baseline with which to measure the trajectory and development over the coming 
years. Primarily, the partnership demonstrates the continued mutual focus on military 
aviation capabilities in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis response. However, given 
Qatar’s government structure as an absolute monarchy, care should be taken to ensure that 
the security cooperation efforts do not have the adverse effect of inducing the government 
to reduce responsiveness to their population, or increase repressiveness. This partnership 
is the best case study with which to highlight the delicate nature of the intersection between 
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partnerships with non-democratic allies for counterterrorism efforts, and acknowledging 
the potential for seeding security issues of the future through these partnerships.  
3. MANG-Kenya SPP 
This partnership is limited to military-to-military engagements, and thus would also 
benefit to expanding their participants to other sectors of government and society. 
Additionally, the security situation in Kenya- the fractured social and political landscape, 
the existing humanitarian crises, and the regional threats- demands greater coordination of 
efforts to ensure that operations in one area do not adversely affect another. Additionally, 
the comparative reticence of U.S. policymakers to commit U.S. resources and forces to 
directly address security challenges in East Africa further heightens this imperative. 
However, it should be kept in mind that limited resources and aid are not necessarily 
drawback. Kenya cannot rely on the United States to solve the security situation, and thus 
rent-seeking behaviors such as policy responsiveness maintain their importance. 
Additionally, fewer U.S. personnel and military operators in the country reduces the 
opportunity of damaging propaganda or politicization of the military presence in 
humanitarian crisis management efforts. 
4. Conclusion 
The SPP as analyzed within the research framework shows a balanced approach to 
security cooperation that addresses many of the concerns highlighted in academia 
regarding the execution of security cooperation in counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis 
response. Specifically, the potential for the program to provide a singular focal point of 
operations across a broad array of actors could help provide the balance necessary to avoid 
the unintended consequences of foreign aid. The limited availability of funds for the SPP 
broadly necessitates prioritization of partnerships that are providing positive feedback to 
the decision-makers. It also helps to mitigate the pitfall of excessive aid to governments, 
which disincentivizes rent-seeking behavior and responsiveness to the receiving country’s 
own population. The funding is not provided directly to the partner nation in order for it to 
fund its own pet programs. Rather, engagements are planned with detailed participant 
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rosters, objectives, and requirements on an annual basis and the partner nation’s 
government is not at liberty to expend funds outside of this narrow engagement.  
Additionally, as evidenced by the engagements of the CONG-Jordan program, 
there is a proven example to conduct an array of engagements with many different 
governmental and non-governmental partners. This example should be kept in mind by 
other programs less developed in longevity and scope as a blueprint for further operations 
that more elegantly address the competing and contradictory needs of counterterrorism and 
humanitarian crisis management. The MANG-Kenya partnership especially could benefit 
from diversifying efforts to address the complex social, economic, and political challenges 
faced by the nation and region, as the program does not face the steep competition for 
resources and attention that the CENTCOM partnerships face. The WVNG-Qatar program 
rests on a stable domestic foundation, unlike that of the other two case studies. Therefore, 
great care should be taken to proactively assess the partnership for the potential to create 
problems where they currently do not exist, prior to expanding operations unduly.  
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The SPP case studies analyzed in this thesis combine policies that have great 
potential to provide a holistic, dynamic focal point in military-centered counterterrorism 
and humanitarian crisis management. However, the limited scope of execution in the 
MANG-Kenya and WVNG-Qatar programs should be addressed as to meet the doctrinal 
whole-of-government approach, which also coincides with better addressing the 
interconnected nature of terrorism and humanitarian crisis events. The CONG-Jordan 
program is well established and diverse, and by both framework measures, successful. 
However, care should be taken across the board to not extrapolate the success of a program 
that is comparatively small regarding budget and personnel and conclude that increasing 
these aspects will yield more success. Instead, continual evaluation of performance through 
thorough data collection and a constant evaluation of terrorism/counterterrorism and 
humanitarian crisis management theories needs to be incorporated through the planning 
and execution processes of the SPP to provide the best chance at meaningful security 
cooperation results. Further, care should be taken in assessing this program to not focus 
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overly on creating assessment metrics that inadvertently demand the SPP become a crisis-
response program. The nature of the program is to provide a stable, ongoing, and strategic 
engagement venue to allow for whole-of-government and whole-of-society resource 
concentration and synergy. Until very recently, the reactionary, under-planned, and 
unpredictable nature of funding and engagements undercut the program’s ability to 
maintain strategic focus. In fact, the current Security Cooperation Branch Chief, Lieutenant 
Colonel Luis Rodriguez, at the NGB Headquarters level interviewed January 24, 2021 for 
this thesis cited the lack of predictable funding, and thus engagements, as the biggest 
challenge to success the program faces.122  
 
 
122 Lieutenant Colonel Luis Rodriguez, State Partnership Program Questionnaire. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This analysis concludes that the SPP as executed between CONG-Jordan is 
effective, from both the doctrinal and research perspectives in bolstering counterterrorism 
and humanitarian crisis response in Jordan. The WV-Qatar and MANG-Kenya 
partnerships are effective in the narrow scope of military-to-military engagement for the 
two security cooperation objectives assessed. However, they do not do enough to realize 
the whole-of-government doctrinal objective, and this limited focus also undermines their 
ability to meet measures of effective counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management 
under the academic research framework.  
Another major shortfall identified in this analysis is the lack of data regarding 
program execution and assessment throughout a partnership’s lifespan. The record-keeping 
inconsistency, and a failure to evaluate the program top-to-bottom and comparatively over 
the decades of its utilization is a missed opportunity to close the assessment loop to answer 
the question of whether the program actually moves the needle of progress towards 
achieving security cooperation objectives. Significantly, the DODI 5111.20 states that the 
Chief of the NGB must approve activities annually, and in coordination with approval, 
provide an assessment to what extent the previous year’s activities made progress in 
achieving theater and country‐specific objectives.123  
There is very little publicly available information regarding the after-action 
evaluations of the program, and consistent program-wide or even partnership-level 
analyses of performance are not published. The only significant review of the program 
conducted by a governmental organization occurred in 2012 from the Government 
Accountability Office. Significantly, that review also identified the lack of records 
regarding program evaluation and standardization of records to be an issue. The SPP must 
overcome this significant deficiency in order to provide information to decision-makers to 
assess and address deficiencies or replicate success in a way that also makes the effort 
 
123 Department of Defense, State Partnership Program, 9. 
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transparent and accessible to potential partners outside the narrow military or government 
channels already established. It is significant to note that this analysis, using both the 
doctrinal and academic frameworks, does lend some insight into program metrics that may 
be useful in assessing whether the program is designed and executed effectively both in 
terms of national security doctrine and strategy, as well as in line with the best research 
available regarding humanitarian crisis management and counterterrorism.  
First, the program needs to avoid setting metrics that force it into a crisis response 
organization. Rather than asking whether the SPP was involved in responding to a crisis, 
or terrorism-related incident, program assessments should seek to identify where skills and 
knowledge regarding security cooperation in these areas has been leveraged. If a 
humanitarian crisis develops in an SPP country, did the NG (or equivalent) respond with 
coordinated effort between non-governmental and governmental assets? Was the response 
politicized or propagandized? In the event of a terrorist attack, and the NG (or equivalent) 
responded, was the response appropriate in terms of respecting the rule of law and human 
rights, so as not to exacerbate the situation and potentially contribute to greater 
radicalization?  
Second, metrics can be developed that are not tied to downstream effects and 
analysis. Instead, the SPP should focus on expanding engagement of non-governmental, 
and non-military, participants in engagements wherever possible. Furthermore, knowledge 
of the SPP is not extensive within the NGB. Billets are often dual-hatted, meaning that the 
personnel are not serving solely the official duties required by the SPP, but are working on 
a part time basis in support of the SPP mission. It is also essential for the program to 
establish more effective records keeping practices, but also to create an outreach program 
that relays information to the wider public regarding SPP opportunities and objectives. The 
lack of publicly available information is an effective deterrent to wider participation 
because it requires prior knowledge of the program’s objectives and opportunities from 
members of the wider public, or it forces program participants to know who and what they 
are looking for outside of military channels and bring them in proactively. Thus, the NGB 
is not fully leveraging their in-house capabilities to support this program. Neither condition 
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is optimal for leveraging all of society’s capabilities and resources to their maximum 
potential.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis should serve as a baseline look at the interconnected nature of 
counterterrorism and humanitarian crisis management policy through security cooperation 
operations under the SPP. In order to understand whether the SPP is effective more broadly, 
research should be done regarding partnerships that have gone dormant, the participation 
of partners in regional security operations prior to and after establishing partnerships, and 
trend analysis regarding year-over-year program execution. Finally, additional research 
regarding the trends of democratic governance in SPP partner nations should be examined 
given the complex nature of terrorism and humanitarian crisis response- is the program 
contributing to undemocratic trends and thus undermining future success in these 
objectives? However, much of this research will encounter the same wall that this thesis 
attempted to work around: the lack of public data. Proxies such as news releases, social 
media, and conversations with program officials are useful, but cannot provide the full 
picture that a robust data repository provides. 
This thesis argues that the SPP, as conducted within the partnerships evaluated, 
provides an effective program to pursue security cooperation objectives in counterterrorism 
and humanitarian crisis management. The program is overall successful due to the stability 
and longevity of relationships that form through the partnership, but also for more nuanced 
reasons that account for the inherent contradictions between providing aid and bilateral 
assistance. The partnerships can be improved to meet doctrinal intent by diversifying 
participants in engagements, and topics for engagement, in order to address the complex 
relationship between terrorism and humanitarian crisis. However, care must be taken to 
avoid expanding the program unduly in order to avoid incentivizing partner nation behavior 
that increases the likelihood of terrorism and thus humanitarian crisis.  
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